Rust PoC (cargo, packages.d/*.toml config) that checks astral-sh/uv's
GitHub Atom feed for a new release, fetches the matching asset via the
GitHub API, and verifies it. Confirmed live against the real repo: uv
actually ships GitHub build-provenance attestations (sigstore bundle) on
every release, so it's a tier-2 package, not the tier-4 same-origin-sha256
guessed in the original spec draft. Verified via `gh attestation verify`
rather than reimplementing sigstore in Rust. State persists across runs so
a second run correctly reports "up to date."
Also folds the finding back into SPEC.md: updates the uv example to
tier 2, derives tier from verification method instead of storing both
(avoids a tier/method mismatch that would mean nothing), marks the
packages.d/ layout question resolved, and updates Architecture/Status to
say what's actually implemented vs. still sketch (build/publish/review
queue, same-origin-sha256 against a live repo, scheduling, non-GitHub
sources, minisign are all still open).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
Corrects the earlier non-goal framing: per-user scale (tracking dozens of
packages) is explicitly in scope, distinct from multi-user/adversarial
config trust, which stays out. Adds a Scaling section covering review-queue
fatigue at volume, per-package check cadence, packages.d/ config layout,
audit-as-core, local repo retention, and GitHub rate limits/staggering.
Also settles the GitHub push-notification question: no true webhook push
for repos we don't own, and a relay-based alternative would need a public
inbound receiver this box's WireGuard-only posture deliberately avoids.
Settles on outbound-only github-atom/conditional github-api polling
instead, added to the config schema as check_method/check_interval.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
Adds an explicit Scope/Non-Goals section (curated personal package list,
not adversarial-config or compromised-vendor-pipeline defense) and a
post-build version sanity check as its own pipeline stage, distinct from
the trust tiers — a correctness gate (does the build report the version
we expected), not a security control. Trims the next-steps list to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
Captures the verification trust-tier model (pinned-key signatures down to
trust-me-bro install scripts) and the daemon architecture discussed: check
-> fetch -> tier-aware verify -> PKGBUILD gen -> local repo publish, with
weak-tier changes routed to human review instead of auto-publish.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
