Commit graph

6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Austin Schaefer
7f4bb4cccf Track scaleway-cli, add version-templated assets and combined checksums
Wire up scaleway/scaleway-cli as a watched package (extra's copy lags
weeks behind upstream). Getting a real second package running exposed
gaps uv's config never hit:

- asset_pattern/checksum_asset_pattern now support a {version}
  placeholder for release assets that embed the version in the
  filename (checker::version_from_tag strips a tag's leading `v`).
- same-origin-sha256 now matches the checksum line by filename instead
  of assuming a single-hash file, to support combined multi-asset
  checksum files like scaleway-cli's SHA256SUMS.
- latest_github_release now confirms each Atom-feed candidate against
  the releases API instead of trusting the newest entry outright —
  scaleway-cli publishes a `-dbg1` tag with no real Release object that
  otherwise sorts newest in the feed.

Confirmed correct against the real repo: no attestations upstream, so
tier 4 (same-origin-sha256) applies, and the checker correctly skips
the dbg1 tag to land on the real latest release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 09:00:53 +02:00
Austin Schaefer
388096264b Set up project tooling to match the rest of ~/dev's Rust fleet
Surveyed sporah/doubleo7/feedsignal/uy-immigration-watcher/notif-picker
for conventions and replicated the current dominant pattern rather than
inventing a new one:

- Forgejo CI (.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml): build/test/audit jobs on the
  rust-ci runner label, cargo+sccache caching, cargo fmt --check, cargo
  clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings, cargo audit. Matches
  sporah/doubleo7/feedsignal/uy-immigration-watcher; notif-picker's
  docker-label/manual-toolchain-install variant looks like an earlier
  iteration superseded by this one.
- Makefile.toml with format/format-check/lint/test/audit/build tasks and
  a `ci` task chaining them — copied from notif-picker's clean version,
  the only project that had this pattern. `cargo make ci` now runs the
  same checks locally that CI runs.
- Explicit empty [workspace] in Cargo.toml (doubleo7's pattern) so a
  nested git-worktree checkout can't accidentally inherit an ancestor
  directory's workspace manifest.
- rustfmt: no rustfmt.toml, matching every sibling project — default
  style is the established convention here, not an oversight.

New for this fleet, since nothing else in ~/dev has it: a git-native
pre-commit hook (.githooks/pre-commit, activated via `cargo make
install-hooks` / `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`) that runs `cargo
fmt` and re-stages whatever it reformats. Chose git's native hooksPath
over the pre-commit(.com) framework or cargo-husky — no extra runtime
dependency, hook is tracked and shareable, and nothing else here needs
Python. Kept to formatting only; clippy/audit stay in CI, which already
covers them and can run heavier checks than a commit hook should.

Fixed one clippy finding (useless format! in checker.rs) and reformatted
the existing code to match the now-enforced default rustfmt style.
`cargo make ci` passes clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
2026-09-11 10:13:29 +02:00
Austin Schaefer
bf46cbf073 First working iteration: check -> fetch -> verify for a real package
Rust PoC (cargo, packages.d/*.toml config) that checks astral-sh/uv's
GitHub Atom feed for a new release, fetches the matching asset via the
GitHub API, and verifies it. Confirmed live against the real repo: uv
actually ships GitHub build-provenance attestations (sigstore bundle) on
every release, so it's a tier-2 package, not the tier-4 same-origin-sha256
guessed in the original spec draft. Verified via `gh attestation verify`
rather than reimplementing sigstore in Rust. State persists across runs so
a second run correctly reports "up to date."

Also folds the finding back into SPEC.md: updates the uv example to
tier 2, derives tier from verification method instead of storing both
(avoids a tier/method mismatch that would mean nothing), marks the
packages.d/ layout question resolved, and updates Architecture/Status to
say what's actually implemented vs. still sketch (build/publish/review
queue, same-origin-sha256 against a live repo, scheduling, non-GitHub
sources, minisign are all still open).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
2026-09-11 10:04:48 +02:00
Austin Schaefer
6361e9eb5e Design for scale: many tracked packages, not multi-user
Corrects the earlier non-goal framing: per-user scale (tracking dozens of
packages) is explicitly in scope, distinct from multi-user/adversarial
config trust, which stays out. Adds a Scaling section covering review-queue
fatigue at volume, per-package check cadence, packages.d/ config layout,
audit-as-core, local repo retention, and GitHub rate limits/staggering.

Also settles the GitHub push-notification question: no true webhook push
for repos we don't own, and a relay-based alternative would need a public
inbound receiver this box's WireGuard-only posture deliberately avoids.
Settles on outbound-only github-atom/conditional github-api polling
instead, added to the config schema as check_method/check_interval.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
2026-09-11 09:24:13 +02:00
Austin Schaefer
8443ecea69 Narrow scope: personal middle ground, not a security framework
Adds an explicit Scope/Non-Goals section (curated personal package list,
not adversarial-config or compromised-vendor-pipeline defense) and a
post-build version sanity check as its own pipeline stage, distinct from
the trust tiers — a correctness gate (does the build report the version
we expected), not a security control. Trims the next-steps list to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
2026-09-11 09:10:06 +02:00
Austin Schaefer
0fa994f60a Add initial design spec for declarative package-update watcher
Captures the verification trust-tier model (pinned-key signatures down to
trust-me-bro install scripts) and the daemon architecture discussed: check
-> fetch -> tier-aware verify -> PKGBUILD gen -> local repo publish, with
weak-tier changes routed to human review instead of auto-publish.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2FEut5tVMNjeVjqhgVZbr
2026-09-11 09:01:30 +02:00